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Sweden:  






Sweden is the forerunner of the Second Demographic Transition. Fertility trends have 
fluctuated greatly since the 1960s, and the 1990s showed both European-highest and 
lowest-ever-in-Sweden levels, while the cohort pattern has been relatively stable. Period 
fluctuations  have  been  accompanied  by  a  postponement  of  entering  committed 
partnerships and parenthood as well as an increasing instability of family relationships. 
The awareness and the availability of effective contraceptives have been extensive since 
the mid-1970s, the year the liberal abortion law was introduced.  
Post-modern  values  are  dominant  in  this  highly  secularized  society,  but  ideal 
family size is among the highest in the European Union, and childlessness has remained 
at a relatively low level. Ethnic diversification has increased over time, with about one-
fifth of the population having a ‘foreign background’ in the early 2000s. The level of 
female  labor-force  participation  is  the  highest  in  Europe  (although  mothers  of  pre-
schoolers often work part-time), and young women are just as highly educated as men. 
Family policies, based on the principle of equality across social groups and gender, 
seem to play an important role in keeping fertility relatively high. In combination with 
other factors, family policies also play a role in the fluctuations of fertility rates, as 
eligibility to parental-leave and benefits as well as the availability of public childcare 
are linked to parents’ labor-force attachment.     
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1. Introduction  
Sweden  is  well-known  as  the  forerunner  of  the  so-called  Second  Demographic 
Transition characterized by the dramatic transformation of family patterns towards less 
committed and more fragile couple relationships, by the later and less likely transition 
to parenthood, and by the sharp reduction of higher-order births currently taking place 
in  Europe  and  European-origin  populations  (Lesthaeghe  1995).  It  may  seem 
contradictory  that  Sweden,  as  a  ‘pioneer’  of  the  Second  Demographic  Transition, 
commonly associated with low fertility, also exhibits one of the highest fertility levels 
in Europe, with a completed fertility close to replacement. This is an issue that has 
puzzled many researchers and continues to do so. In this chapter, we aim to shed some 
light on some of the crucial features of Sweden’s demographic and socio-economic 
landscape, hopefully increasing our understanding of this apparent paradox. 
Sweden  is  the  largest  country  in  Scandinavia,  both  in  terms  of  land  area  and 
population size – currently about 9.1 million. Period fertility has strongly fluctuated 
below the replacement level since the late 1960s along with a relatively stable cohort 
pattern of about two children per woman for women born in the 20
th century. High rates 
of non-marital cohabitation, extramarital childbearing, and partnership break-up have 
accompanied this trend. The infant mortality rate is low and average life expectancy is 
high, even by international comparison, with 82.8 years for women and 78.4 years for 
men in 2005. Up to the 1930s, the country saw negative net migration, but following 
the Second World War Sweden became a land of immigration. In 1960, 4% of the 
population (ca. 300 000 people) was foreign-born, but this share increased to 12 % 
(over one million people) by the early 2000s. Including individuals born in Sweden 
with both parents born abroad, the proportion of those with a foreign background equals 
16  %  of  the  population  in  2005 (SCB  2004a,  2006a).  Because  of  immigration,  the 
population growth rate has remained positive, unlike the growth rate in some other 
European countries. However, Sweden is among the five countries with the highest 
percentage  of  elderly  aged  65+  in  the  population,  displaying  one  of  the  highest 
dependency ratios in Europe (Council of Europe 2005). Thus, population aging, which 
is the result of long-term below replacement fertility and low  mortality, is a  major 
concern of policy makers owing to the challenges it imposes on the welfare state.  
Sweden  is  the  prototype  of  the  Social  Democratic  welfare  state  pursuing  a 
‘solidary market economy’ based on free education, full employment merged with an 
active  labor  market  policy,  a  collective  bargaining  system,  and  generous  social 
provisions that are redistributing between individuals and across various life stages of 
individuals  through  the  tax  system.  Sweden’s  public  policies  reflect  a  strong 
commitment to gender equality based on ideals of women and men equally sharing paid 
work and family responsibilities. Family taxation was replaced by individual taxation in Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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the early 1970s, and female employment rates in Sweden have been among the highest 
in  Europe  ever  since,  with  nearly  one-third  of  mothers  of  pre-school-aged  children 
working part time (SCB 2003a). The vast majority employed in the public sector are 
women, which at least partly explains why the occupational structure in Sweden has 
remained markedly gender-segregated. Yet, gender equality is promoted also by family 
policies  as  seen  in  the  parental-leave  system  introduced  in  the  mid-1970s.  These 
policies, with further reforms since, enhance fathers’ involvement in active parenting 
and the provision of subsidized, high-quality public childcare enable women and men to 
combine employment and parenthood. In fact, it has been argued that Swedish fertility, 
relatively  high  compared  to  most  other  European  countries  at  least,  is  due  to  the 
construction  of  Swedish  family  policy  (Bernhardt  1992)  and  the  ‘woman-friendly 
Swedish political culture’ (Hoem 2005, p. 568).  
In this chapter we analyze recent childbearing trends in Sweden. First, we discuss 
the development of fertility in the 20
th century with an emphasis on the final decades, 
focusing  thereafter  on  the  most  important  proximate  determinants  of  fertility.  Next, 
ideational  changes  are  highlighted,  followed  by  a  discussion  of  changes  in  social 
conditions and on public policies that modify family behavior. Concluding remarks on 
fertility development and its explanations round up the chapter.  
 
 
2. Fertility trends  
After  a  nearly  continuous  decline  over  the  first  four  decades  of  the  20
th  century 
followed by the baby-boom of the 1940s, and somewhat lower but stable fertility levels 
in the 1950s, childbearing trends in Sweden have shown a roller-coaster pattern from 
the  1960s  onwards  (Hoem  and  Hoem  1996).  Often  explained  by  women’s  sharply 
increasing labor-force participation, the TFR decreased from a high of 2.48 children per  
woman in 1964 to a low of 1.61 in 1983, when it turned, resulting in a ‘mini baby-
boom’ in the late 1980s-early 1990s (Figure 1). Nearly 124 000 children were born in 
1990, when the period TFR reached replacement level for the first time since 1968, in 
combination with the highest female employment rates ever. This was followed by a 
marked decline in fertility in the 1990s, with around 89 000 births per year by the end 
of the decade. In 1998-1999, the lowest TFR (1.51) ever in Sweden was recorded. This 
may  be  compared  to  the  low  birth  rates  in  the  mid-1930s,  when  the  ‘crisis  of  the 
population question’ was one of the main topics of the Swedish political discourse, 
given a TFR of around 1.70, which resulted in lower reproduction rates than recent 
comparable fertility rates, given higher death rates then. Even though fertility has been 
slowly increasing again since the year 2000, the number of deaths exceeded the number 
of births in the 1997-2001 period - for the first time ever in post-transition Sweden. Oláh & Bernhardt: Sweden: Combining childbearing and gender equality  
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Fertility continued to rise with the period TFR reaching 1.77 (101 000 children born) in 
2005 (SCB 2002a, 2004b, 2006b).    
 
 





















Source: SCB 2002a, 2006b, Council of Europe 2005. 
Note: The time lag between the period TFR and cohort TFR is 30 years. 
 
 
While the period TFR has remained below the replacement level since the late 
1960s (except 1990), most cohorts born in the 20
th century have displayed a fertility 
level of around two children per woman. Completed cohort fertility also showed more 
moderate fluctuations than did period fertility trends (see Figure 1). Women born in 
1904-1905 had the lowest fertility, with 1.8 children on average, while the cohorts born 
in the first half of the 1930s saw the highest fertility (nearly 2.2). For younger cohorts, 
especially those born in the 1970s or later, fertility is expected to remain below two 
children per woman (SCB 2002a).  
The decline and the strong variations in period fertility since the 1960s are related 
to (i) the postponement of first childbearing, also noticeable in the cohort pattern, and 
(ii) the changing proportion of families with more than two children, which also is Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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partly related to the deferment of parenthood. Delaying the first birth increases the risk 
of  childlessness  and,  given  the  biological  limits,  it  reduces  the  span  available  for 
reproduction and thereby the number of children born to the women involved. Within a 
period of 35 years the age of entry into parenthood increased by five years, from a mean 
age of 24 and 26.6 for first-time mothers and fathers, respectively, in 1970 to 29 and 
31.5 years in 2005 (SCB 2002b, 2006a) (see Figure 2). Looking at cohorts born 30 
years earlier, we can link the start of the postponement of parenthood to those born in 
the mid-1940s. For the 1960 cohorts, there is no noticeable difference in the mean age 
at first childbearing by cohort and period. While we do not have data for cohorts after 
1960, there is no reason to assume any changes in this pattern.  
 
 
Figure 2:   Mean age at first birth for mothers and fathers, Sweden,  

















Source: SCB 2002a, 2006b. 
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The increase in the mean age of first childbearing over time is the result of the 
strong  variations  in  younger  women’s  first-birth  fertility  and  a  smooth  but  nearly 
constant increase in first childbearing among women aged 30 and above. From the mid-
1960s to the mid-1980s, the propensity to have a first child declined among women 
below 30 years of age, it increased thereafter until the early 1990s, when it declined 
again but stabilized in 1998, and it increased slightly after 2000. For women in their 
30s, the propensity of first birth rose from the early 1980s, followed by a decline in the 
1990s,  only  to  climb  again  since  1998  (Andersson  2004a).  First-birth  rates  among 
women in their 40s increased over time, even in the 1990s. Men’s first childbearing 
patterns are very similar to those of women, but men are on average two years older 
than women when they have a first child (SCB 2002a).  
Strong  period  fluctuations  characterized  the  higher-order  birth  rates  as  well. 
Second-birth  fertility  fell  in  the  late  1960s  but  became  rather  stable  thereafter.  It 
increased sharply as birth intervals shortened related to changes in the parental-leave 
program in the 1980s. Currently, almost half of all second births occur before the first 
child turns 2.5 years of age. The propensity of second birth declined between 1992 and 
1997, but rose again thereafter (SCB 2002a, Andersson 2004a). The two-child norm is 
well established in Sweden. Among those who become parents before age 35, about 
80% also have a second child. At the same time, only 20% of all births are of third or 
higher order (SCB 2002a). Between the mid-1960s and 1977, third- and fourth-birth 
rates  decreased,  then  the  trend  reversed.  The  increase  was  interrupted  in  the  early 
1990s, followed by a decline that stabilized and slightly reversed after 1997 (Andersson 
2004a).    
As mentioned, the strong fluctuations of period fertility rates were accompanied by 
a rather smooth pattern of increasing postponement of childbearing over time. In the 
1960s  and  1970s,  fertility  was  highest  at  ages  around  the  mid-20s  (25-26  years), 
shifting gradually to the late 20s from the mid-1980s (Figure 3). In 2005, the highest 
fertility displayed was at the age of 30. Similarly, since the 1990s next highest fertility 
has been seen for the ages of late 20s and early 30s, instead of the early 20s, as was 
previously the case. At the beginning of the 21
st century, women aged 29-31 have the 
highest fertility, next highest are those in their early 30s, and fertility is higher at ages in 
the mid- and late 30s rather than in the early 20s (SCB 2006c).   
 Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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Source: SCB 2006c. 
 
 
The pattern is similar also when we look at cohort fertility. While the total number 
of children by age 40 is about two for all cohorts displayed (we have no data for that 
age for the cohorts born in the 1960s), fertility at younger ages, especially at age 30 and 
below, is lower for cohorts born after 1945 than for the older cohorts (Figure 4). The 
youngest cohorts (born in the late 1950s and early 1960s) seem to have caught up in 
their late 30s. Women born in 1955 and 1965 had lower first-birth rates at ages 20-30 
but higher rates in their 30s and 40s than earlier cohorts. The 1975 cohort (not displayed 
here) had even lower first-birth rates before age 25 than those born ten years earlier 
(SCB 2002a).   
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Figure 4:   Accumulated fertility up to certain ages for female birth cohorts
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Source: SCB 1999.  
Note: Up to and including age. 
 
 
The  proportion  childless  at  the  end  of  the  reproductive  period  declined  across 
cohorts of the mid-1920s and mid-1930s, but increased among those born in the late 
1940s and reached 15% among the cohorts of the late 1950s (Figure 5). Given fertility 
trends in the 1990s, childlessness is likely to increase further among those born in the 
1970s and later, but will remain at a moderate level compared to, e.g., German-speaking 
countries.  Also  the  share  of  one-child  families  decreased  among  the  older  cohorts 
displayed, from about one-fifth for those born in the mid-1920s, stabilized for those 
born between the late 1930s and early 1950s, and declined smoothly across those born 
later in that decade to 13% for the 1960 cohort. Thus, having only one child is a rarely 
chosen family-pattern, while being the next frequent one among those born 35 years 
earlier. The two-child norm applies to all cohorts, especially those born in the mid- and 
late 1940s as nearly half of them (45%) have two children. Having three children is also 
a quite common pattern chosen by about every fifth woman. The proportion of large 
families, i.e., with four or more children, diminished across cohorts but leveled off for 
those born in the late 1940s and increased slightly for cohorts born in the mid- and late Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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1950s. Nevertheless, the share of families with more than two children has been quite 
stable  –  around  30%  across  the  cohorts  displayed  here  (SCB  2006c).  This,  in 
combination with the high proportion of two-child families and a moderate level of 
childlessness, can explain the rather stable pattern of cohort fertility in Sweden.     
 
 













































































Source: SCB 2006c  
 
 
In sum, the strong fluctuations in period fertility rates below the replacement level 
in the last four decades have been accompanied by a quite stable cohort fertility level 
(around two children per woman). Parenthood has been increasingly postponed, linked 
to the structure of the parental-leave program, but the proportion of childless and of 
one-child families has remained at a moderate level, unlike in some other European 
countries. In the following sections we seek explanations for these trends. 
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3. Proximate determinants of fertility  
3.1 Partnership trends  
Fertility development has been closely related to changes in partnership trends. With 
the exception of a small increase in 1974 when both divorce and marriage procedures 
were simplified and apart from a ‘marriage-boom’ in 1989 when, related to changes in 
the  widows-pension  rules,  the  number  of  marriages  nearly  trebled  compared  to  the 
1970s and 1980s (Hoem 1991), the propensity to marry decreased steadily in Sweden 
from  the  late  1960s.  At  the  same  time,  the  prevalence  of  non-marital  cohabitation 
increased rapidly, first among divorced women, then also among the never-married. Of 
the  co-residential  partnerships  of  Swedish  women  and  men  aged  25-34,  85%    are 
cohabiting unions, according to data from the Eurobarometer Surveys of 2000 and 2001 
(Kiernan 2004). In fact, at the beginning of the 21
st century, only a small fraction of 
first partnerships starts as marriage (Andersson 1998, Bernhardt 2002). This may also 
be  linked  to  the  concept  of  gender  equality,  as  own  earnings  and  thereby  financial 
independence  have  increasingly  enabled  women  in  Sweden  to  postpone  marriage 
without giving up the advantages of a co-residential relationship.      
In the mid-1970s, childbearing began to precede marriage, as having children in 
cohabiting relationships had become accepted
3 (Thomson 2005). Since then, the mean 
age at first birth has been below that of first marriage; both events being increasingly 
delayed (see Figure 6). The proportion of extramarital births in Sweden has been among 
the  highest  in  Europe  for  decades,  yet  the  share  of  births  to  single  mothers
4  has 
remained at around 10 per cent except for the mid-1990s (SCB diff. yrs., 2005a, 2006c). 
Couples often marry after the first or second birth. Today, nearly 60% of all children 
and two-thirds of all first children are born in non-marital cohabiting relationships in 
Sweden (Figure 7). Birth intensities are usually higher, however, for married women 
than they are for cohabiting women at least up to parity 3 (see Berinde 1999; Santow 
and Bracher 2001; Oláh 2003, forthcoming).   
 
                                                            
3 Children born within and outside marriage have the same rights in Sweden since the late 1960s  
(Kiernan 2004). 
4 Single here means not being co-resident with the child’s father at the time of the birth. Such information is 
published only for the years since 1995. Data for previous periods distinguish only between marital and extra-
marital childbearing.  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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Source: SCB 1999, 2002a, 2006b. 
 
 
Divorce rates have increased in parallel with decreasing marriage rates. Due to the 
liberalization of the divorce law (i.e.,  no-fault divorce, no  waiting time  for couples 
without children and merely 6 months for those with children), the divorce risk rose to 
around twice its previous level in 1974, mostly due to an increasing propensity among 
childless women to divorce. Then and in the following year, the number of divorces 
exceeded 25 000 compared to a maximum of 16 000 a year previously, resulting in a 
total divorce rate of 0.5 (50 of 100) (Council of Europe 2005; SCB 2007a). From the 
1980s, especially the late 1980s, the divorce propensity increased again, but this time 
mainly  for  mothers.  The  increase  leveled  off  at  the  beginning  of  the  21
st  century 
(Andersson 2004a). While we do not have exact statistics regarding the disruption of 
non-marital  cohabiting  unions,  it  has  been  shown  that  these  unions  are  even  more 
fragile  than  marriages.  For  example,  among  couples  with  children,  the  risk  of 
partnership dissolution is at least twice as high in cohabiting relationships as is the risk 
among married parents in Sweden (Oláh 2001; SCB 2003a). The high separation and 
divorce propensity can also be linked to gender equality. While spousal alimony after 
divorce was abolished by the new law in 1974, employment brought women financial Oláh & Bernhardt: Sweden: Combining childbearing and gender equality  
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independence and empowered them to leave an unsatisfactory relationship even if they 
have children.    
 
 
Figure 7:  Proportions of extra-marital births in 1900-2005, and of births to 















Source: SCB diff. yrs., 2005a, 2006c, 1996-2001, 2001-2003, 2004-2005.  




The growing prevalence of the more fragile non-marital cohabiting relationships 
and  the  increasing  divorce  rates  also  have  contributed  to  the  decline  of  fertility  by 
reducing  the  time  of  living  in  a  stable  partnership  in  which  one  considers  having 
children. For example, a couple may need a prolonged period to feel secure about the 
relationship surviving the tensions brought about by childrearing. Also, the period of 
conflicts  prior  to  separation  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  time  for  childbearing. 
Furthermore,  the  proportion  of  first  births  occurring  in  the  first  co-residential 
partnership decreased over time. About 80% of the cohort born in 1949 had the first 
child in the first relationship compared to 70% of the 1959 cohort (SCB 1995). As more 
people have ended the first relationship childless, the time available for reproduction Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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shortened, which can suppress the number of children eventually born. Nevertheless, 
the number of higher-order relationships formed in the reproductive years increased 
(Bernhardt and Goldscheider 2002), and possibly childbearing in such unions did so, 
too. It has been shown, e.g., that Swedish women whose first and second children were 
born in different relationships had a higher third-birth intensity than those who had two 
children with the same partner (Hoem and Hoem 1989). In 2001, about 6% of two-child 
parents had their children with different partners compared to nearly one-fifth of those 
with  three  children  (SCB  2002b).  Stepfamily  fertility  is,  however,  a  complex 
phenomenon (see e.g., Vikat et al. 1999) and to estimate its contribution to the total 
fertility of the country is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
 
3.2 Birth control and abortion  
Pregnancy interruption was a crime prior to 1975, but the Abortion Law of 1938 did 
allow  some  exceptions:  abortions  due  to  medical,  humanitarian,  and  eugenic 
indications. In 1946, a socio-medical indication was added, which made abortion an 
option for women with many children who lived in difficult economic circumstances. 
Since relatively young, healthy women with no or only few children were denied the 
procedure, the number of illegal abortions remained high well into the 1960s. A more 
liberal  interpretation  of  the  old  abortion  law  then  became  normal  practice,  which 
resulted  in  a  gradual  disappearance  of  illegal  abortions.  In  the  mid-1970s,  a  new 
abortion law was enacted, which stipulated legal abortion on demand up to the 12
th 
week  of  pregnancy.  The  new  law  was  combined  with  a  regulation  providing  free 
contraceptive advice and subsidized contraceptives. The main aim of the new policy 
was to prevent unwanted pregnancies and to make all children born, wanted children. 
This has been an important prerequisite for the combination of work and family, which 
has been the dominating pattern for several generations of Swedish women.  
Currently, highly effective contraceptive methods (the pill and the IUD) are easily 
available and widely used in Sweden. Thus, birth control is largely in the hands of 
women, using efficient methods not directly related to the sexual act, unlike the earlier 
male  methods  of  using  a  condom  or  coitus  interruptus.  The  use  of  condoms  has 
decreased  in  the  last  decades,  substituted  by  ‘modern’  methods  (the  pill  or  IUD). 
According to surveys conducted in 1967 and 1996, the same proportion (60%) used 
condoms, the pill or IUD at the time of the latest coitus. About 20% of the couples rely 
on traditional methods (mostly coitus interruptus); this proportion has remained fairly 
stable for several decades (Socialstyrelsen 2005). However, as reliance on traditional 
methods is clearly age-related and used less frequently by young people, this proportion 
may be decreasing over time. A reason for the continued, relatively frequent use of Oláh & Bernhardt: Sweden: Combining childbearing and gender equality  
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traditional methods might be the fact that abortion on demand has been available (as a 
backup for contraceptive failure) since the mid-1970s (and was, in fact, quite easily 
available  even  before  that,  with  the  old  abortion  law).  This  may  also  explain  the 
relatively infrequent use of sterilization in Sweden. A new law introduced in 1976 has 
permitted  the  sterilization  of  men  and  women  above  age  25.  An  estimated  10%  of 
middle-aged couples have relied on this method of birth control at the end of their 
reproductive period. In 75 % of the cases, it is the woman who is sterilized. Swedish 
couples prefer to rely on safe but reversible methods, giving them a ‘second chance’ to 
have children with new partners after the break-up of earlier relationships. 
A recent study on the changing seasonality of births in  Sweden (Cassel 2002) 
suggests that births increasingly are consciously planned, as the last decade of the 20
th 
century  exhibits  a  complete  break  in  the  seasonality  pattern.  Given  frequent  sexual 
activity during holiday periods, more children used to be born in early spring and fewer 
in the autumn before modern contraceptives and abortion were readily available. Under 
the new pattern, more children are born in the summer as conceptions are planned more 
consciously. 
The first infant conceived using IVF (in vitro fertilization) in Sweden was born in 
1982. In the early 21
st century, the annual number of such deliveries had grown to about 
1500,  representing  a  little  less  than  2%  of  all  deliveries.  The  use  of  the  technique 
follows the maternal education level (Socialstyrelsen 2006a). Part of this may  be due to 
differences in the maternal age distribution between women of different educational 
levels: Women with higher education postpone their pregnancies longer than those with 
lower education and with increasing age, the risk for infertility increases and so does 
the risk of IVF. 
One aspect of sexuality and birth control that is rather special for Sweden is the 
early introduction of sex education in schools, which had already begun in the mid-
1940s. When abortion on demand was introduced in 1975, sex education programs were 
strengthened in the schools, and special family planning clinics were established for 
young people who do not need their parents’ permission to seek contraceptive advice 
and  services.  The  sex  education  curriculum  does  not  concentrate  on  marriage,  yet 
emphasizes the value of lasting and intimate personal relationships and the need for 
responsibility in sexual relationships. There is a positive attitude towards sexual activity 
among  young  people,  including  those  not  living  in  co-residential  relationships,  and 
abstention is not recommended as a way to avoid unwanted pregnancies. 
 Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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Figure 8:  Number of induced abortions per 1000 women in different age 










































































Source: Socialstyrelsen 2000, 2006b. 
 
 
The current law permits abortion on the request of a pregnant woman until the 18th 
week of pregnancy and thereafter only in cases of severe indications, which constitutes 
less than 1% of all abortions. More than half of the induced abortions are performed 
before the end of the seventh week of pregnancy. Since 1975, the total annual number 
of cases has averaged between 30 000 and 38 000, indicating that, in combination with 
the number of births per year, about one-third of women have had at least one abortion 
during  their  reproductive  period.  There  has  not  been  much  variation  across  social 
groups;  rather  by  sexual  behavior  and  relationship  patterns  (Socialstyrelsen  2005, 
2006b). The rate of teenage pregnancy as well as the birth rate among teenagers is very 
low in Sweden (Darroch et al 2001). By age group, the abortion rate is highest among 
women 20-24 years of age (see Figure 8). 
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3.3 Ideational changes  
3.3.1 Family ideals  
Swedes attach a high importance to the family. Yet, the country has a weak family 
system, where the individual takes priority over the family group, and young people 
leave the parental home at a relatively early age; in most cases to live independently 
before forming co-residential unions of their own (Bernhardt et al. 2005a). In his study 
of family ties in Western Europe, Reher (1998) describes the Swedes as committed to 
‘individualism and residential autonomy’. Thus, it may seem surprising that according 
to  the  European  Values  Study,  including  32  European  countries  (Halman  2001), 
Swedes are somewhat more likely than the ‘average European’ to say that the family is 
very important in their life. Children are considered important but not necessary for a 
fulfilling life, in line with the post-modern values dominant in Sweden, which are also 
reflected in the higher than average proportions who say that friends and leisure are 
very important in their life. Further evidence of post-modern values is found in the high 
tolerance towards childlessness and alternative family forms other than marriage with 
joint children.  
It is noteworthy that, in a country characterized by a high prevalence of unmarried 
cohabitation,  as  much  as  80%  of  the  population  disagree  with  the  statement  that 
marriage is an outdated institution. Swedes also tend to think that both husband and 
wife should contribute to the household income (higher than average) and that paid 
work is important for women’s independence. Fewer than average think that home and 
children are more important to women than paid work. The European Values Study thus 
gives a clear picture of a society where egalitarian families are a prominent part of the 
overall value structure. It is also well known that Sweden is a highly secular country, 
and this is reflected in the responses to the question of how important God is in one’s 
life. Sweden (and Denmark) score the lowest of all of the 32 countries included in the 
study. Swedish survey data for young adults show that the relatively few (about 14%) 
who consider religion important in their lives score significantly higher on familism 
than those who consider religion unimportant (unpublished results). 
The personal ideal family size among Swedish women aged 20-34 is among the 
highest in the European Union (2.4 children per woman), with a very low percentage 
considering one (or no) child as preferable (Goldstein et al 2003). A survey of young 
adults in Sweden (22-34 years of age) confirms the strong two-child norm in Sweden: 
that is the desired or intended family size of about 60% of the respondents, while less 
than 10% prefer to have just one child (or no child at all). However,  fewer than 5% 
want four children or more, thus the emphasis is on having two (or possibly three) 
(Bernhardt 2005).  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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3.3.2 Norms and attitudes  
Studies on the impact of culture and norms on individual childbearing behavior are so 
far relatively rare in Sweden, despite strong theoretical underpinnings. An exception is 
Bernhardt and Goldscheider (2006), who analyzed Swedish survey data (Family and 
Working Life in the 21
st century) on attitudes toward parenthood among young adults 
aged 22-30 in 1999, some of  whom became parents over the following  four  years. 
While both men and women perceive more benefits to parenthood than costs, men are 
more likely to perceive both the negative consequences of parenthood, such as loss of 
personal  freedom, economic  problems and  less time  for  friends, and they are  more 
likely than women to expect positive consequences, such as an improvement in their 
relationship with their partner and a life with more meaning. However, men with more 
egalitarian attitudes perceive fewer costs and more egalitarian women perceive fewer 
benefits than those  with  more traditional attitudes. The analysis of  the  transition  to 
parenthood indicates that, even when controlling for an assessment of the costs and 
benefits of children, men with more traditional attitudes were more likely to become 
fathers at an early age. In contrast, there were no gender differentials in the effect of the 
costs and benefits, each of which strongly affected the transition to parenthood, but, of 
course, in opposite directions. 
Bernhardt  and  Goldscheider  (2007)  have  analyzed  three  different  aspects  of 
socially constructed gender expectations among young adults in Sweden. Namely these 
are the preferred balance between work and family when the couple has pre-school 
children, views on whether parents should share equally the responsibility for child care 
tasks, and attitudes to gender equality in the workplace and in the society at large. Men 
and women did not seem to differ in their views on shared parenting, i.e., concerning 
parental  responsibilities  in  everyday  life,  norms  about  how  the  practical  tasks  with 
regard to childcare should be shared. In contrast, young women are much more in favor 
of gender equality in work life, economic autonomy, and an egalitarian work-family 
balance. This gender differential may be due to different notions about the division of 
housework, with men being less enthusiastic about housework than about childcare
5.  
Another  study,  using  the  same  data  set,  focused  on  the  relationship  between 
attitudes, evaluations, and intentions on the transition to marriage or separation among 
cohabiting young adults, in the Swedish context of considerable social acceptance of 
unmarried  cohabitation  even  among  parents  (Moors  and  Bernhardt  2006).  Which 
ideational factors influence their propensity either to formalize their relationship by 
getting married or to split up? A two-wave panel study including 705 never-married 
                                                            
5 One difference between the question about the work-family balance and that of shared parenting was that 
the first one mentions ”responsibility for home and children” and the second one makes reference only to 
childcare. Oláh & Bernhardt: Sweden: Combining childbearing and gender equality  
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respondents cohabiting at the time of the first survey in 1999 shows that ideational 
factors influence subsequent  behavior, even  when different sets of control variables 
were included in the model. In the four-year period following the first survey, there 
were 113 separations and 168 marriages, while 414 respondents were still cohabiting 
with the same partner four years after the initial survey.  
As  was  hypothesized,  familistic  attitudes  were  found  to  influence  subsequent 
transitions among cohabiting couples, making marriage more likely and decreasing the 
likelihood  of  separation.  Work-related  values  of  success,  by  contrast,  increased  the 
likelihood of both transitions, indicating that ‘career-orientation’ either leads to a more 
stable  form  of  living  arrangement,  i.e.,  marriage,  or,  if  the  relationship  is  not 
satisfactory, to a break-up. Respondents who were highly satisfied with their current 
relationship were more likely to marry and less likely to separate, while those who felt 
that being single again would improve their well-being, behaved in the opposite way, 
confirming the authors’ hypotheses and corresponding with earlier findings. Intentions 
to marry and childbearing plans (among the childless) also influenced behavior among 
cohabiting  couples,  making  them  more  likely  to  marry  and  less  apt  to  separate. 
Intentions only partly mediate the effect of attitudes and effects appear to be stronger 
for female respondents. 
 
 
3.4 Changes in social conditions  
3.4.1 Ethnic composition  
The  increasing  prevalence  of  new  family  ideals,  norms,  and  attitudes  has  been 
accompanied by changes in different aspects of social conditions, among other things, 
by changes in the ethnic composition of the population. While previously a relatively 
homogeneous society, immigration has become an important component of population 
growth  in Sweden in the  second half of the 20
th century. In the 1960s, labor-force 
immigration dominated, mostly from other Nordic countries, but also from Southern 
Europe.  From  the  mid-1970s,  the  main  reason  for  immigration  has  been  family 
reunification, as well as asylum. In the 1990s, a large number of refugees came from the 
Balkans. Yet, the proportion of immigrants of non-European origin has been constantly 
increasing.  Currently  more than every  fifth person in the Swedish population has a 
‘foreign background’, i.e., they are foreign-born or born in Sweden to foreign-born 
parents, including the 6% of the population with one parent born abroad (SCB 2004a).  
These  substantial  changes  in  ethnic  composition  raise  issues  such  as  the 
immigrants’ (and their children’s) adaptation to Swedish values, especially regarding 
gender equality and family patterns. In a recent study on attitudes and behavior related Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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to family and work, young adults living in Sweden with at least one parent born in 
Poland or Turkey were compared to native Swedes (i.e., those with two Swedish-born 
parents) of the same age (Bernhardt et al. 2005b). Young women and men of Turkish 
origin displayed a more distinct family pattern than the other groups as they were much 
more likely to live in the parental home while unmarried, much less likely to cohabit, 
and  much  more  likely  to  be  married,  although  they  held  more  favorable  attitudes 
towards cohabitation than their behavior would suggest. Also, they were less supportive 
to inter-partnering and fewer considered an egalitarian work-family balance as ideal, 
where women and men share support and care giving responsibilities for young children 
(60% versus 75% among the native Swedes and those of Polish origin). Women were 
more egalitarian in all ethnic groups than men, but the difference was largest in the 
group  of  Turkish  origin.  Not  surprisingly,  educational  attainment  and  exposure  to 
Swedish society (in terms of neighborhood composition) were found to be important 
determinants of family attitudes and behavior of young adults of both ethnic origins 
studied,  with  implications  for  prospective  changes  in  both  behavior  and  attitudes, 
approaching  those  of  the  native  population  (for  further  details  on  this  issue,  see 
Bernhardt et al. 2007).      
The fertility of immigrants has not been studied much in Sweden, but the few 
important exceptions (Andersson 2004b; Andersson and Scott 2005) show that period 
fertility  trends  of  Swedish-born  and  immigrant  women  have  been  quite  similar  for 
several decades, and during the 1990s, birth-intensities for parities 1-4 decreased for 
these groups alike. Labor-market status was found to be important for the timing of first 
birth of both native and foreign-born women in the 1980s and 1990s, as low income 
reduced the propensity to become a mother while high income increased it, as did a 
good local business climate. Being enrolled in education greatly suppressed fertility 
across all  groups. Contrary  to public belief, immigrant  women  who received  social 
assistance (i.e., welfare benefits) had a 30-60% lower risk to have a first child than 
Swedish-born women, except for those born in Finland, Germany, and Thailand, all of 
whom are most likely to live with a Swedish man (Andersson and Scott 2005).    
 
 
3.4.2 Education  
Education is another prominent aspect of social conditions. During recent decades, the 
population  in  Sweden  has  become  more  highly  educated.  At  the  same  time,  the 
differences between the sexes regarding the proportion of highly educated have greatly 
diminished, and by 1990 women aged 25-64 years were just as educated as men. By the 
early 2000s, a higher proportion of women than men, i.e., 41% versus 34%, had high 
education  in  ages  25-44  years  (SCB  2004c).  The  proportion  with  only  primary Oláh & Bernhardt: Sweden: Combining childbearing and gender equality  
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education diminished across cohorts, from about one-third of the 1945 cohort to 12% 
among women and 18% among men born in 1960. These changes in educational levels 
also had implications for fertility, related especially to the postponement of parenthood. 
While the deferment of first birth is noticeable for all educational levels across the 
1945-1960 cohorts (Figure 9), it is greater at the highest than at the lowest educational 
level (2.2 years versus 0.9 years, respectively for women, and 2.0 versus 1.4 years for 
men).   
 
 
Figure 9:  Mean age at first birth at different educational levels for Swedish 
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Childlessness  is  more  common  among  the  tertiary-educated  women,  whereas 
highly educated men are the most likely to become fathers (Figure 10). The increase in 
childlessness has been lowest for both women and men among those with the highest 
education.  Regarding  the  number  of  children,  there  is  very  little  difference  across 
educational levels among men who are fathers. Among women, average family size has 
been largest among the least educated and smallest among the most highly educated Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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across cohorts (Figure 11), even though the propensity to have a child is at least as high 
for the highly educated women as for those with less schooling. The  more educated 
become mothers at a higher age and therefore have a shorter reproductive span and thus 
fewer children than the least educated (SCB 2002a).  
 
 
Figure 10:  Proportion childless (%) at different educational levels for  



















Source: SCB 2002a. 
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Figure 11:  Average family size (number of children) among parents at 
different educational levels, Swedish women born 1945-1960 and 



















Source: SCB 2002a. 
 
 
The level of education attained may be, however, less important for fertility than 
the field of education, as two recent studies have shown analyzing register data on 
Swedish women born in 1955-1959 (Hoem et al. 2006a, 2006b). Education and fertility 
were regarded as dynamically interactive processes that mutually determine each other. 
Although permanent childlessness was seen to increase somewhat across educational 
levels and ultimate fertility was seen to decrease, the field of education appears to have 
a far greater impact than the level itself, given substantial variations in childbearing 
behavior  across  those  at  different  educational  fields  at  all  educational  levels.  In 
particular, childlessness is lower and ultimate fertility is higher among women educated 
for jobs in health care and teaching than in other groups, while those educated in arts or 
for (non-teacher) humanist occupations have unusually high fractions of childless and 
low  ultimate  fertility.  Childlessness  is  also  very  high  among  women  with  religious 
education, but they have quite ordinary ultimate fertility, similar to those with research 
degrees.  The  authors  of  the  studies  conclude  that  educational  orientation  can  better 
capture the dynamics of education and childbearing, that are mediated through public Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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policies than the level of education alone, as it reflects the structure of the educational 
system  inclusive  of  its  gender  aspects  as  well  as  a  person’s  preferences  regarding 
occupation and family life.  
 
 
3.4.3 Economic development  
Female  labor-force  participation  had  already  been  substantial  before  women’s 
educational attainment approached that of men. Since the 1970s, female employment 
rates in Sweden have been among the highest in the developed world, nearly catching 
up with those of men (Figure 12). The high level of female employment was seen as a 
main  reason  for  the  fertility  decline  between  the  mid-1960s  and  the  mid-1980s, 
although  changes  in  attitudes  as  well  as  the  availability  of  increasingly  effective 
contraceptives (e.g., the pill, IUD), which allowed women to take control over their 
childbearing, were probably just as important for fertility trends (SCB 2002a). In the 
second  half  of  the  1980s,  increasing  female  labor-market  participation  was 
accompanied by a substantial increase in fertility, followed by a dramatic decline of 
both birth rates and employment rates in the 1990s. The pattern of pro-cyclical fertility 
was  shown  to  be  generated  by  childbearing  behavior  that  was  strongly  attached  to 
income  development  at  the  micro-level
6,  given  the  income-related  parental-leave 
benefits parents of young children receive in Sweden (for details, see the next section) 
(Andersson  2000).    This  was  also  shown  at  the  macro-level  given  the  positive 
association of first-birth rates and municipal employment levels (see Hoem 2000). The 
positive effect of income on the propensity to give birth was found to be strongest for 
young childless women. The effect was positive but less intense for first birth among 
women in their thirties, and even more moderate for second birth. Also, among men 
higher income was found to be positively associated to the propensity to have the first 
child.  For  those  below  age  30,  the  effect  of  income  was  smaller  for  men  than  for 
women, unlike in the ages of thirties and forties (RFV 2001). As for third-birth rates, it 
was shown that women with a high income had a higher propensity, while the pattern 
was U-shaped among men, i.e., both for those with high and those with low income had 
higher third-birth rates than other men (RFV 2003).   
 
                                                            
6 Santow and Bracher (2001), too, reported a positive effect of two years of full-time employment on the 
propensity to have a first birth within the next year. They also have shown that, among both women and men, 
having been in regular employment increases the propensity of entering cohabitation and of marrying without 
cohabiting first (Bracher and Santow 1998), which are also related to fertility as discussed earlier. These 
studies are based on Swedish survey data, while Andersson (2000) and Hoem (2000) used register data.  Oláh & Bernhardt: Sweden: Combining childbearing and gender equality  
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Source: OECD 2006. 
Note: Total labour-force (% of population from 15-64 years). 
 
 
In  the  early  1990s,  uncertainty  in  the  labor-market  rose  drastically.    The 
unemployment rate increased substantially from a level of 2-3% of the previous decades 
to about 10% (OECD 2006) (Figure 13), and temporary employment contracts as well 
as employment for specific ‘projects’ became more and more common, especially at 
ages below 30 (SCB 2003b; Bygren et al. 2005). Among young people and immigrants, 
unemployment rates stood above 10% (SCB 2006d). As it has become increasingly 
difficult to find a stable job, the age of labor-market establishment (i.e., when 75% of 
young people are in employment) rose from 21 years in 1987 to 28 years by 1994 for 
men. This decreased to 26 years thereafter, where it remained since, and from 22 years 
in the late 1980s to 30 years in the mid- and late 1990s for women, decreasing to 28 
years in the early 2000s (SCB 2002c, 2003b, 2006d) (Figure 14). At the same time, 
educational enrolment nearly doubled among both women and men during the main 
childbearing years (i.e., at ages 25-34), from a proportion of somewhat below 5%  in 
1991 to about 10 % by the late 1990s. Looking at enrolment by sex and age groups 
since  1993  (when  such  data  are  available),  which  is  the  period  immediately  after Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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Sweden  was  hit  by  severe  economic  crisis,  we  find  the  greatest  increase  in  the 
proportion of those studying among women at ages mid- and late 20s, followed by the 
early thirties (Figure 15). The growth in the proportion enrolled in education has been 



















Source: OECD 2006. 
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Figure 14:  Age of labor-market establishment among Swedish women and 
















Source: SCB 2002c, 2006d. 
 
 
The substantial increase in the proportion of young people enrolled in education, 
especially  of  those  at  main  childbearing  ages,  has  also  contributed  to  the  fertility 
decline, as students have generally much lower birth-risks than others. The propensity 
to have a first child was reduced by 50% for women in their 20s who studied compared 
to those not in education. Second- and third-birth rates were reduced by about 30% for 
students. Interestingly, there was no clear negative effect of educational enrolment for 
childless  women  in  their  30s,  perhaps  because  the  space  for  further  motherhood 
postponement is smaller for them (Andersson 2000). Among men who study, first-birth 
rates were about 40% lower than among those not in education (RFV 2001). Temporary 
employment contracts, too, were shown to reduce fertility; such women and men having 
more than 20% lower first-birth risk than those in permanent jobs. Among women aged 
30  and  above  the  propensity  to  become  a  mother  was  about  35%  lower  for  the 
temporarily  employed  (Regeringskansliet  2001;  SCB  2001).  The  lower  birth 
propensities of students and those with temporary work contracts can be explained by 
parental  benefits  being  income-related  and  by  the  job-guarantee  attached  to  the 
parental-leave program being available only for those in stable employment, a position Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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which became increasingly difficult to obtain for young people in the 1990s. Thus, the 
compositional changes (i.e., the doubling of the proportion enrolled in education, a 
substantial  increase  of  the  fraction  of  young  people  with  temporary  employment 
contracts, and the smaller share of those with a permanent position and a good income) 
can explain at least part of the decline in first and second-birth rates in the 1990s. 
 
 
Figure 15:  Proportion of Swedish women and men (%) enrolled in higher 


















































































Source: SCB 2007b (own calculations). 
Note: Data on enrolment by age are available only for the years displayed here.   
 
 
Although unemployment is an important component of the context based on which 
young people plan their childbearing, it does not seem to suppress fertility by itself. In 
fact, the propensity to have a first child was even higher among women and men who 
received unemployment benefits in the previous year compared to other groups (Hoem 
2000;  RFV  2001).  Also,  no  important  effect  of  unemployment  was  shown  on  the 
childbearing of mothers (Andersson 2000). However, when entries into and exits from 
unemployment  were  considered,  even  two-child  mothers  were  shown  to  have  a 
somewhat elevated risk to give birth (i.e., have the third child) in a certain year if they Oláh & Bernhardt: Sweden: Combining childbearing and gender equality  
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received unemployment benefits in either of the two preceding years, compared to those 
in continuous employment (Hank 2001). The explanation of unemployment having a 
positive effect on childbearing may be linked to the Swedish parental-leave program, 
according to the authors of these studies. This is due to the fact that parental benefits 
may be higher than unemployment benefits, facilitating the decision to have a first child 
especially when one’s prospects for employment are not really bright. Mothers can take 
advantage of the so-called speed-premium, which again would ensure as high a level of 
benefits as after the previous birth if the next child is born within 30 months (see details 
in the next section).  
To  claim  a  straightforward  positive  association  between  unemployment  and 
fertility  would  be  premature,  however.  Monthly  time  series  of  conceptions  and 
abortions for the period 1987-2000 show that the rising unemployment rate in the early 
1990s was followed almost immediately by a decrease in conceptions (Cassel 2005). 
With a delay of about one and a half years, abortions started to increase. Thus, both 
conceptions and abortions followed the unemployment trend, and they worked together 
to  decrease  the  annual  number  of  births.  Out  of  the  total  decline  in  births  from 
September 1991 to March 1997, 23% were due to a fall in conceptions given widely 
practiced efficient contraception, and 5% were due to a rise in the abortion risk. Hence, 
there is no doubt that economic development has become an important determinant of 
fertility in Sweden, not unrelated to changes in public policies.      
 
 
4. Public policies modifying fertility and family behavior  
It is not the stated goal of Swedish family policy to encourage childbearing or to keep 
the fertility rate at a certain level.  It is, however, the stated goal of Swedish gender 
equality policy to enable both women and men to combine jobs with parenthood. For 
example,  the  Equal  Opportunities  Act  of  1992  states  that  it  is  each  employer’s 
obligation to make it easier for both male and female employees to combine work and 
parenthood. In fact, family policies and gender equality policies in Sweden are not two 
separate entities, but are closely interwoven and constructed to mutually support each 
other.  It  has  been  argued  that  gender-equal  family  policy  in  Sweden  has  been 
successful, i.e., in promoting a gender-equal society, in keeping the relatively high birth 
rate, and in providing support for families and children (Bernhardt 2005; Hoem 2005). 
Public policies in Sweden are based on the principle of equality, both across social 
groups and between women and men. Most social benefits are universal, except for 
housing benefits and social allowance, which are means-tested. Marital status matters 
very little for welfare provision, although some taxation rules are more advantageous 
for married couples, who also automatically inherit from each other, unlike cohabiting Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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couples. As for transfers regarding children, there is no distinction based on whether 
they were born within marriage or not. The main principle of social security in Sweden 
is that every adult is responsible for her or his  maintenance through own earnings, 
unless being incapable of work because of sickness, disability or old age in which case 
she/he is eligible for special social provisions (sickness benefits, pension). There is no 
spousal alimony at divorce as both women and men are expected to be in paid work, 
which is promoted also by individual taxation introduced in 1971 (Oláh 1998). Yet, 
gender  equality  applies  not  only  to  labor-force  participation  but  also  to  family 
responsibilities, with family policies facilitating the combination of employment and 
childrearing for both women and men. 
 
 
4.1 Parental leave  
The  most  important  component  of  Sweden’s  family  policy  is  the  highly  flexible 
parental-leave program introduced in 1974. Sweden was the first country in the world to 
acknowledge fathers as caring parents on a par with mothers. Parents who were in paid 
work for at least six months in the year prior to a birth were provided with a six-month 
leave,  with 90% income replacement to be shared between themselves. Those  with 
shorter or no previous employment have received a flat-rate benefit, which is currently 
180  SEK  per  day  (Försäkringskassan  2006a;  JÄMO  2006).  The  parental  benefit  is 
taxable  and  paid  by  National  Social  Insurance,  not  by  the  parent’s  employer.  Job 
security and pension entitlement is attached to the leave, which can be used on a daily 
or nearly hourly basis up to the eighth birthday of a child.   
The leave was extended several times: to 9 months in 1978, to 12 months in 1980 
and to 15 months in 1989. Since 1980 the last three months have been compensated 
with a low flat-rate benefit of 60 SEK per day. At the same time, fathers have become 
entitled  to  ten  days  of  additional  leave  after  a  birth  (the  so-called  daddy-days), 
compensated  at  the  same  level  as  the  parental  leave.  To  further  facilitate  the 
combination of employment and parenthood, parents have the choice to work part-time 
if they wish until their child is eight  years old, with an equivalent reduction of their 
earnings. In addition, they are entitled to 60 days ‘temporary parental leave’ annually 
per child (below age 12) for the home care of a sick child. This leave can also be used 
in case the childminder is ill (Björnberg 2002). As a large part of the parental- leave is 
covered by the income-related benefit, this provides a strong economic incentive to 
establish oneself in the labor-market (and of having a stable income) for young people 
before opting for parenthood. Thus, the structure of the Swedish parental-leave program 
has probably strengthened the trend of postponing childbearing over time and may at 
least partly explain the decline of fertility in the 1990s, given the substantial proportion Oláh & Bernhardt: Sweden: Combining childbearing and gender equality  
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of people in their 20s enrolled in education as well as difficulties to find a stable job, 
especially at ages below 30.       
Since 1995, one month of the parental-leave has been reserved for the father and 
another month for the mother in order to promote a more gender-equal uptake of the 
leave. At the same time, the benefit level has been reduced to 80% of the previous 
income except for the last three months, and to 75% in 1996-1997. It may not be a pure 
coincidence that the two years following the further reduction of the benefit level also 
displayed  the  lowest  TFR  ever  recorded  in  Sweden  (1.5  in  both  1998  and  1999), 
especially in combination with the economic hardships that families experienced due to 
the economic recession (Hoem 2000; Hoem 2005). The benefit level was increased 
again to 80% in1998 (Sundström and Duvander 2002) and has not changed since. From 
2002, the leave includes 16 months in total, of which 2 months are reserved for each 
parent, the rest to be divided as the parents wish.  
  As  part  of  the  leave  has  been  reserved  for  fathers  since  the  mid-1990s,  the 
proportion of men taking leave has increased, but the average length of leave they take 
shortened at least partly due to the reduction of the benefit level (RFV 2002). Highly 
educated fathers, those with a higher income and/or with a highly-educated partner are 
more likely to take parental leave than other fathers, while men with a weak labor-force 
attachment and foreign-born fathers are much less likely to do so. At present, nearly 
half of the users of the parental-leave are fathers, but their uptake is about one-fifth of 
all parental-leave days a year (Försäkringskassan 2006b). Father’s uptake of parental-
leave seems to be of importance to keep fertility relatively close to the replacement 
level in Sweden, as it has been shown to increase the propensity to have a second and/or 
third child (Oláh 2003; Duvander and Andersson 2006).  
The parental-leave program has influenced childbearing trends in Sweden also in 
other ways, as it contributed to the increase of birth rates in the 1980s due to the so-
called  speed-premium,  which  caused  a  shortening  of  birth  intervals  (Hoem  1990; 
Andersson 2004a). Since 1980, parents of more than one child have been entitled to 
benefits at least as high as for the previous child, without returning to the labor- market 
in-between births, if the interval between two subsequent births was 24 months at most. 
In 1986, this interval was extended to 30 months. Among mothers who had a first child 
in 1989, 45% had a second child within 30 months after first birth compared to less than 
30% of mothers who had their first child before 1983 (SCB 2003b). Also third-birth 
rates  were  affected  by  the  speed-premium  (Andersson  1999).  The  shortened  birth 
intervals have been found for parents at all educational levels. Not only the magnitude 
in the change in spacing behavior, but also the rapidity in the adaptation to the new 
rules was very much the same across educational groups given the immediate response 
to the extension of the eligibility interval to 2.5 years in 1986. There were no substantial 
differences by education in later years either (Andersson et al. 2006).   Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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4.2 Public childcare  
The  combination  of  employment  and  parenthood,  and  thus  gender  equality,  is  also 
promoted by the extensive provision of high-quality public childcare in Sweden. This is 
also considered as a guarantee of equality regarding the provision of care and education 
as well as the redistribution of resources between children across social classes and 
ethnic origin. Public childcare is provided mainly by the municipalities, financed by 
government subsidies and to a minor extent by parents’ fees. The latter is linked to 
family income and the number of hours a child spends in the daycare center; but has a 
ceiling (the so-called maxtaxa, introduced in 2002). In the 1970s and 1980s, the state 
and the municipalities each covered about 45%  of the costs, but the proportion of 
parents’ contribution rose to 17% by the late 1990s (Bergqvist and Nyberg 2002).   
Public childcare is available for parents of pre-school aged children, the former 
who study or who are gainfully employed for at least 20 hours a week. Since 2002, even 
children of unemployed parents and those on parental-leave are guaranteed three hours 
a day at the daycare center (Bernhardt 2005). Today, nearly all children of full-time 
working parents have a place in public childcare, with only small differences across 
educational levels and socio-economic statuses. The proportion of children aged 0-6 
years enrolled in public daycare centers increased from 2% in 1966 to 53% in 1996, 
while the share of children in public family daycare increased from 1 to 17%. The share 
of childcare provided by the private market
7 increased to nearly 15% by the late 1990s 
(Björnberg 2002), as non-municipal childcare centers have become eligible for public 
subsidies since 1991.  
The childcare system has usually been seen as a key factor for Sweden’s relatively 
high fertility rates, but the impact of regional variations in the quantity, quality, and 
price of daycare on continued childbearing was found to be limited, at least in the late 
1990s (Andersson et al. 2004). According to the authors of the study, this suggests that 
the overall coverage of childcare is currently sufficiently high in Sweden for fertility 
decisions to be made independently of specific characteristics of childcare in the local 
area.   
 
                                                            
7  Most  private  childcare  centers  are  run  by  non-profit  organizations,  mainly  by  parental  cooperatives. 
Commercial daycare centers accounted for about a quarter of private childcare by the late 1990s (Bergqvist 
and Nyberg 2002). Grandparents, other relatives or informal childminders provide only a limited proportion 
of care, given high employment rates and the lack of subsidies for these forms of private childcare (Björnberg 
2002).    Oláh & Bernhardt: Sweden: Combining childbearing and gender equality  
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4.3 Housing  
While  not  directly  related  to  family  policy,  housing  availability  is  another  issue  of 
importance for childbearing. In a survey on Swedish women and men aged 30-45, good 
housing was considered as the third most important economic factor that affected the 
respondents’  childbearing  decisions  (Löfström  2003).  This  finding  is  related  to  the 
growing  influx  of  young  people  to  the  large  cities  in  the  1990s,  when  housing 
construction remained relatively limited resulting in dramatically increasing housing 
costs. Birth rates have remained relatively low in the large cities, as the number of 
childless people is high and those having their first child in a large city municipality 
seem to be less likely to have further children (SCB 2005b) – both of these are likely to 
be linked, among other things, to housing availability. However, the issue has hardly 
been studied. As an exception, a preliminary analysis of data from a recent Swedish 
survey on housing and childbearing indicates that the housing shortage contributed to 
the fertility decline of the 1990s (Ström 2006).  
 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
Sweden has been seen as the ‘model country’ of the Second Demographic Transition, 
given the substantial changes in family patterns, both for partnerships and childbearing, 
as early as in the late 1960s-early 1970s. The strong period fluctuations in fertility in the 
final  decades  of  the  20
th  century  have  been  accompanied  by  quite  a  stable  cohort 
fertility level (around two children per woman), which may decline somewhat for more 
recent cohorts.  Although parenthood has been increasingly postponed since  the  late 
1960s, the proportion of childless and of one-child  families is expected to increase 
moderately  at  most.  As  Billari  and  Borgoni  (2005)  have  shown,  the  postponement 
effect on completed fertility seems to be rather weak in Sweden, or in other words, 
Swedish  men  and  women  show  a  strong  tendency  to  ‘recuperate’  postponed 
childbearing. This may be due to the overall more favorable societal conditions for 
parents  (labor-market  regulations,  the  childcare  system,  and  gender  relationships), 
making further childbearing quite feasible once the couple has made the transition to 
parenthood.  The  increasing  prevalence  of  egalitarian  attitudes  may  also  have 
contributed to the postponement of childbearing, as it has been shown that men who are 
holding  more  egalitarian  attitudes  tend  to  postpone  the  transition  to  fatherhood 
compared to those with more traditional attitudes towards gender equality (while no 
such  effect  was  found  for  women).  Thus,  gender  equality  may  on  the  one  hand 
contribute to delayed childbearing, and, on the other, favor ‘recuperation’ and thus lead 
to higher completed fertility.  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 28 
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Female labor-force participation rates in Sweden have been among the highest in 
Europe. This also was considered as a main reason of the fertility decline between the 
mid-1960s and early 1980s, along with the increasing dominance of post-modern values 
and the availability of effective modern contraceptives and abortion on demand in case 
of contraceptive failure, allowing women to control their childbearing. The second half 
of the 1980s and the 1990s showed a pattern of pro-cyclical fertility as childbearing 
became strongly related to income development at both micro and macro levels. This 
pattern equally applied to native Swedes and the increasing fraction of immigrants in 
the Swedish population.   
Swedish family policy, based on the principle of equality across social classes and 
gender, is shown to have strengthened both the delay of entry into parenthood and the 
pattern of pro-cyclical fertility. Eligibility to parental leave and the availability of public 
childcare have been linked to the (prospective) parents’ labor-force attachment, with the 
level of earnings determining the parental benefit. These policy measures by themselves 
provided incentives for women’s gainful employment, while the parental leave program 
also promoted men’s active involvement in parenting, especially since the mid-1990s. 
The result is a society where egalitarian family ideals are more prominent than in most 
other European countries, and also nearly equally supported by women and by men 
(even if studies on the actual sharing of housework and childcare still show a noticeable 
gap between ideals and reality). Thus, combining childbearing and gender equality may 
be a way to keep fertility from dropping to the very low and/or lowest-low levels seen 
in many European countries, all of which had had higher fertility than Sweden until 
about 20 years ago. This is a strategy that seems to work, at least for Sweden.       
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